The main contribution of this paper is to jointly estimate the effects of financial development and inflation on growth. We aim to exploit both the cross-section and the time-series dimension of the data on inflation, growth and some banking and stock market indicators over the period 1961-1993 for a sample of OECD countries.
Introduction
The joint evolution of inflation, financial development attained by an economy and its rate of growth is the outcome of the decisions made by private agents, the policy actions carried out by the public sector and the shocks hitting each economy during a given period. Despite this joint determination, the empirical growth literature has separately approached the study of the links among these variables by estimating the effect of financial development and inflation on growth. Looking at these links separately within the framework of convergence regressions, two facts seem firmly established: first, that the development of the financial sector in an economy fosters growth and, second, that high inflation harms growth.
The long-run incidence of financial development has been discussed in a short but insightful series of papers that find a significant positive correlation among growth and a set of indicators for both banking and stock market development.
Causality seems to be running from finance to growth, rather than in the opposite direction (King and Levine (1993 a, b) ). The link between inflation and growth has been extensively studied but the results are here far more controversial (Barro (1995) ). A fair balance of these results indicates that inflation rates account for a small but significant proportion of the total variance of growth rates. Although causality may be running both ways, the negative effect of current inflation upon future growth rates cannot be rejected at standard significance levels.
These two strands of the empirical literature have lived separate lives. This is somewhat surprising, for one thing because some models indicate that policies of financial repression 1 have adverse effects on long-run growth and are also associated to high inflation rates. In particular, high inflation rates are usually considered as indicators of the intensity of such repression. According to the implications of this class of models, the negative medium-term correlation among inflation and growth might be driven by a third variable, namely by the extent to which the public sector seeks to finance large deficits by imposing unwarranted regulations to the banking system. According to other models, the only substantial long-run effect of inflation comes through its interaction with the financial system.
Our work is closely related to that of Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) and Haslag and Koo (1999) who study the joint dynamics of inflation, growth and financial depth with slightly different objectives. Boyd, Levine and Smith's main concern is to ascertain whether high inflation hinders financial development, whereas Haslag and Koo assess the empirical validity of the growth-financial development link to the presence of financial repression indicators, the rate of inflation among them. Both papers conclude that the development of the financial system is negatively affected by past inflation; additionally, Haslag and Koo find that inflation is never significant in growth regressions also including financial development and/or financial repression (the reserve requirement ratio) indicators. These results reinforce the empirical validity of the growth-financial development link but contribute to cast some doubts on that running form inflation to growth. The main contribution of this paper is to jointly estimate the effects of financial development and inflation on growth to ascertain whether the estimated negative long-run effect of inflation on growth withstands the presence of banking and stock market indicators in otherwise standard convergence regressions. We test this hypothesis using time series data on inflation, growth and some banking and stock market indicators over the period 1961-1993 for a sample of OECD countries in order to exploit both the cross-section and the time-series dimension of the data. We focus on OECD countries because we are interested in the role of the financial system in industrialized economies, which is presumably different from that role in countries in the early stages of the development process.
We rely on two complementary empirical approaches. First, we describe the statistical links among inflation, growth and banking system development in terms of
Granger causality tests performed on tri-variate VAR models estimated allowing for the presence of country specific effects. The results show that the link among finance development and growth is less reliable than it is usually meant, whereas that running from inflation to growth seems to be more robust. However, since we are dealing with endogenous variables, sample correlations are not enough. Thus, our second exercise consists of including inflation and financial market variables in growth regressions, augmented with country dummies, which we estimate by instrumental variables. Our results indicate, first, that the long-run costs of inflation are not explained by policies of financial repression, and second, that if inflation affects growth through its interaction with the financial market, this is not the only (nor the most important) channel.
These results must be interpreted with caution. We have made use of the set of proxies for financial development that is standard in the empirical literature. This choice is justified in order to make comparisons with other empirical work easier.
However, this choice is far from being unquestionable. On the one hand, these standard indicators do not cover all the agents or institutions that provide financial services (for instance, bond markets or insurance companies are not represented in these indicators). On the other hand, these indicators are mainly measuring the size of the institution or market, but it would also be desirable to use measures of efficiency of the financial system as well. We believe that these shortcomings are behind the weakness of the finance-growth relationship we have found for our sample of OECD countries. The construction of indicators that properly capture the efficiency of the financial system is an issue that deserves further research.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the theoretical and empirical results linking inflation, growth and financial system development. The analysis of causality is discussed in Section 3, whereas Section 4 presents the estimated effects of including inflation and financial variables in otherwise standard growth equations. The main conclusions of the exercise are summarised in Section 5.
The theoretical and empirical background
Most of the theoretical work in this field deals with the potential impact of financial development on growth assuming the former to be exogenous. (1973) and Shaw (1973) were among the first to provide insightful theoretical foundations for the fact that the liberalisation and development of financial markets favour economic growth. Subsequent theoretical work has studied in depth this 2 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) is one of the remarkable exceptions.
direction of causality running from financial development to economic growth (Pagano (1993) , Levine (1997) ). The different mechanisms which explain how financial intermediation can affect growth may be classified in three groups: effects on the saving rate, effects on the proportion of saving funnelled to investment and effects on the efficiency in the allocation of capital.
Since the seminal work by Goldsmith (1969) The long-run effects of inflation have been studied in a similar framework (Orphanides and Solow, 1990 and De Gregorio, 1993) . Besides the fact that a high and volatile inflation reduces the real rate of return of capital and undermines the confidence of domestic and foreign investors, inflation also affects the accumulation of other determinants of growth such as human capital or R+D investment. This channel constitutes what is known as the accumulation or investment effect of inflation on growth. But, over and above these effects, inflation also worsens the longrun macroeconomic performance of market economies by reducing the efficiency with which productive factors are used. This is the so called efficiency channel, 3 The empirical literature has focused either on measures of banking activity (King and Levine (1993a,b) ) or on measures of stock market development (Atje and Jovanovic (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) ). In both cases the statistical association between the growth rate and the financial indicators seems to be equally robust. See also Demigürc-Kunt and for a recent collection of empirical studies on the relationship between financial structure and economic growth. according to which higher inflation induces bigger forecast errors by distorting the information contents of prices, so encouraging economic agents to devote more time and resources to gather information and to protect themselves against the damages caused by price instability. This endangers the efficient allocation of resources.
From an empirical point of view, a series of recent papers have addressed the study of the long-run influence of inflation on growth within the framework of augmented convergence equations (Barro (1995) ). The main findings of this body of empirical literature may be summarised as follows. First, inflation has a negative temporary impact upon long-term growth rates; this effect is significant and generates a permanent reduction in the level of per capita income. Second, inflation not only reduces the level of investment but also the efficiency with which productive factors are used 4 .
In contrast to the previous models that focus on genuine effects of financial development and inflation on economic growth, two classes of models deal simultaneously with the role of these two variables in the process of growth. On the one hand, a recent wave of theoretical articles has focused on the effects of inflation on growth that arise through its interaction with financial markets. These papers show different channels whereby high inflation exacerbates informational frictions afflicting financial markets, thus, depressing the level of activity and generating a significant cost in terms of future growth rates. De Gregorio and Sturzenegger (1994a,b) present models in which the ability of financial intermediaries to distinguish among heterogeneous firms is reduced as inflation rises leading to a larger share of credit allocated to less efficient firms. In contrast, in the paper by Choi, Smith and Boyd (1996) inflation reduces real returns to savings and makes more severe the adverse selection problems in capital markets inducing a higher degree of credit rationing.
Finally, Huybens and Smith (1999) . Moreover, these models 5 However, Espinosa and Yip (1996) present a model that generates a "Laffer curve" type relation between inflation and repression. Thus, in some cases (when financial repression is severe enough so that an informal financial sector emerges) liberalization may be inflationary. Roubini and Sala-iMartin (1995) argue that policies of financial repression have two different effects: an increase in the inflation tax base (due to the increase in money demand) and a decrease in the income-tax rate (implied by a reduction in income). Thus, these authors suggest it is more likely that a government predict that financial repression will also have adverse real effects to the extent that a badly functioning financial sector decreases the efficiency in the allocation of savings.
As a consequence, these models suggest that the negative effect of inflation on growth is spurious as both high inflation and low economic growth are caused by policies of financial repression. In related theoretical research, Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1996) compare the implications of several quantitative models to explain the growth effects of inflation found in the literature. They conclude that inflation per se does not have significant effects on growth, but financial regulations and their interaction with inflation have substantial effects on growth.
Summing up, these models indicate that policies of financial repression have adverse effects on long-run growth and are also associated to high inflation rates.
Thus, the negative correlation between these two variables is driven by a third one.
On the other hand, according to the models stressing financial market frictions, the real effects of inflation come through its interaction with the financial system, reducing the efficiency with which this sector operates and, thus, harming growth. If either of these were relevant channels through which inflation affects growth, the coefficient of the inflation rate in convergence equations should be dramatically affected by the inclusion of measures of financial development. Before we test this hypothesis, the next section is devoted to study the causality relationships among these variables.
A first look at the data: Causality analysis
The construction of synthetic indicators of the volume of services provided by choose to repress the financial sector if tax evasion is large because in such a case the increase in the inflation tax base is not offset by a substantial reduction in the income-tax base. the financial system is not an easy task. First, because the services provided are very diverse (management of the payment system, mobilisation of savings, information gathering, risk diversification, exerting corporate control), and second because the agents that provide these financial services are also heterogeneous (banks, securities markets, insurance companies, among others). As a result, there is a wide spectrum of indicators of financial development used in the empirical literature 6 . In this paper, we use the set of proxies for banking development proposed by King and Levine (1993a,b) that has been recurrently used in most of the subsequent empirical work. Additionally, we consider market capitalization as a measure of stock market development (Levine and Zervos (1998) ). Thus, the data set includes annual variables for 21 OECD countries over the sample period 1961-1993 with the only exception of market capitalization that is available for 16 countries and only over the period 1971-1993. 7 The data set incorporates four measures of banking system development (BTOT, DCPY, QLLY and RESERVES) and one indicator of stock market development (MKTCAP).
8 The variable labelled QLLY is defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities (excluding currency in circulation and demand deposits) of the financial system to GDP. We consider this variable, as it is usual in the literature, as a proxy of financial depth since it represents the size of the formal financial intermediary sector.
The implicit assumption is that the size of the financial system is positively related to the provision of financial services. The variable labelled DCPY is defined as the ratio of claims on the non-financial private sector to GDP. This measure tries to proxy the amount of credit available to the private sector through the banking sector. Implicitly we are assuming that the credit granted to the public sector may respond to different criteria from those used to grant credit to private agents. The variable labelled BTOT is defined as the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets. It tries to capture the importance of banks relative to the central bank. The idea behind the use of such variable is that deposit banks are more likely to provide risk sharing and information services than central banks. We have also constructed a variable labelled RESERVES that is defined as the ratio of claims on monetary authorities to demand deposits plus other deposits of banking institutions. We consider that this variable, even reflecting a policy instrument -the reserve requirement ratio-, can be also described as a proxy of the degree of financial development. The implicit hypothesis here is that countries with high reserve ratios have less developed financial systems than countries with low reserve ratios (in particular, Haslag and Koo (1999) have found evidence in favour of this hypothesis). Finally, we label MKTCAP to the ratio of domestic shares on domestic exchanges in a year divided by GDP. It measures the size of the stock market and it is the usual indicator of market development. This variable tries capture the fact that the stock markets provide services for growth that are different from those provided by banks. To analyse causality relationships among inflation, growth and financial system developments, we estimate the following unrestricted VAR model:
where Y it is a vector including the logarithm of per capita GDP 9 , the rate of inflation (π it ) and a financial variable (F it ), C i is a constant (which we allow to differ among 9 We include the level of per capita income instead of the growth rate of output because the effect found in the literature on inflation and growth is more properly a level effect (Andrés and Hernando (1999) ). Testing causality to the growth rate only entails adding linear restrictions on the coefficients in A j1 (L) and the results are similar to those presented here. countries) and U it is a vector of error terms i.i.d. with constant variance and zero mean. The vector X it includes additional regressors usually suggested by growth theory. The lag-polynomial matrices A(L) and B(L) take the following form:
where A ij (L) is a lag polynomial of order p such as
Causality tests are run on the joint significance of the coefficients of A ij (L) matrices outside the main diagonal of matrix A(L). Thus, for instance, the rejection of the null hypothesis that the A 12 's are zero indicates that π causes y in the Granger sense.
The elements of matrices A(L) and B(L) will be assumed to be homogeneous among countries. The estimation of (1) raises several methodological issues 10 , the most important one being the possibility that some variables are non-stationary, in which case exclusion tests do not have a standard distribution. There are several ways in which the hypothesis of causality between integrated variables can be tested making use of statistics with asymptotic standard distribution (see, for details, Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990) . The method proposed by Dolado and Lütkepohl (1996) does not require searching for cointegration vectors, which is quite often a hazardous task in panel data models. These authors propose the OLS estimation of a VAR in levels of order p+1. The exclusion test performed on the p first lags is thus distributed asymptotically as an F, whereby the loss of efficiency by the over-parameterisation of the model is compensated by the test's consistency and simplicity. The application of this method requires knowing the true order, p, of the VAR. In this paper, rather than discussing the structure of the lags in detail, we present results for a sufficiently broad range of lags that ensure the stationarity of the residuals. The model contains a bunch of additional regressors aimed at capturing other aspects of the macroeconomic stance that help to forecast the future course of the variables of interest.
The results are presented in Table 2 and may be summarised as follows. First, current inflation provides relevant information on output prospects in OECD countries. The null of non-causality can be rejected in all cases at the 5% level of significance. As for the sum of the coefficients of lagged inflation in the output equation it is always negative and significant. Moreover, current output developments also help to explain the future course of the inflation rate. The t-statistic is in this case always positive and in most cases significant. These effects are robust to alternative financial variables being included in the VAR and to different lag-structures. Second, things are different when analysing causality relationships from financial variables to output and the other way round. Causality from QLLY and DCPY to output is easily rejected at the 10% significance level. A similar picture emerges for the variable RESERVES. The test of causality from BTOT to output is less conclusive but the t-statistic is hardly significant. Only the variable of market capitalisation helps to forecast future output with a positive and significant t-statistic.
Causality from output to financial variables is overwhelmingly rejected.
Finally, the causality relationships between financial variables and inflation are also far from conclusive. On the one hand, inflation does not help to predict future financial variable dynamics. This result is in contrast with a recent paper by Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) who present evidence in favour of a strong negative association between inflation and financial market performance. On the other hand, two out of the five financial variables considered help (at least for some lagstructures) to predict future inflation. However, this result is not very robust to the lag structure. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients of past financial variables in the inflation equation differs also considerably across models: it is negative for BTOT, positive, and in some cases significant, for QLLY and DCPY and it changes signs for the different models including RESERVES and MKTCAP. These results give weak support to the link among finance development and growth, whereas they confirm that running from inflation to growth. Moreover, the causality results are not in favour of the close relationship between inflation and financial development suggested by the models stressing financial market frictions 11 .
Inflation and finance in augmented convergence equations
In this section we turn our attention to more standard convergence equations suitably augmented to include both the inflation rate as well as some indicators of financial development. Although the analysis carried out in the previous section gives 11 As an alternative to the OLS with country dummies procedure used, we also tried the strategy followed by Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) . This strategy consists in estimating equation (1) in first differences by the generalized method of moments (GMM). Using this procedure yields a much lower the level of significance of the causality tests. a first account of the dynamic relationship among the variables of interest, the issue of causality cannot be fully settled in that empirical setting. In order to asses the longrun effect of inflation on output, the estimation of convergence equations is the natural approach, both because it is a long run effect what we are looking at and because most of the work done in this field has adopted this framework. Also, growth equations focus in a particular way of causation, i.e. that running from inflation and finance to growth, which is the one we are interested in. We estimate linear versions of the convergence equations making use of four-year averages of the raw annual data (expressed in logs) covering the period 1961-1992. More precisely, in this specification the growth rate of per capita income is regressed on the initial level of per capita income, the rate of investment, the rate of schooling, the growth rate of population, a linear trend and a constant. In order to test the effects of interest, we augment these equations with the inflation rate and with some indicators of financial development. Table 3 Overall, these results indicate, first, that it seems to be a genuine effect of inflation on growth and, second, that the development of the financial system could favour economic growth. Both effects are apparently not related, although if any the former seems to be stronger. However, before to draw any conclusion out of these estimates it is convenient to take a closer look at these relationships, trying to correct 12 A possible interpretation is that the trend may be capturing the process of sustained reduction in the rate of growth in per capita income suffered by OECD countries during part of the sample period. See, for a similar result, Andrés and Hernando (1999). for some biases that might arise in these specifications. In particular, we address two of the most common criticisms to the empirical framework adopted. First, we augment the empirical model to allow for cross-country heterogeneity and, second, we estimate by instrumental variables to take into account the simultaneity among the considered variables.
There are several reasons to include individual effects in convergence equations estimated with multi-country data sets. The very existence of differences in the rates of technical progress or, as it is more likely, in the initial conditions of each country, would lead to the presence of idiosyncratic effects in growth equations. As a result, the consideration of individual effects might alter significantly the estimates of the convergence equations (Islam (1995) ). Then, it is interesting to test if the estimates in Table 3 are affected by the omission of these country-specific (timeinvariant) effects. For this reason, in Table 4 we present estimates of the fixed effects models, which we compute including a dummy variable for each country in the linear convergence equation. Again, to save space, we only present the coefficient estimates for inflation and financial development indicators. A substantial change to note as compared the previous model is the change in the estimated coefficient of the trend that now recovers its expected positive sign; the coefficient is in some cases significant, with a point estimate of around 0.01. The parameters of the initial per capita income and of the accumulation rate of physical capital are higher in absolute value and the coefficients of the accumulation rate of human capital and of population growth are non-significant.
The coefficient of the inflation rate remains negative and significant and its size is lower than that obtained for the model without individual effects. Moreover, given that the coefficient of initial per capita income is now twice as large as the one of the model without country dummies, the long-run cost of inflation is now lower.
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On the contrary, the coefficients of the indicators of financial development become non-significant or, in some cases wrongly signed, the only exception being that of MKTCAP which is positive and significant (both with and without inflation among the regressors).
16
The OLS estimates of the effects of inflation and financial system development on growth, presented in Tables 3 and 4 , may exhibit a non-negligible simultaneity bias. First, inflation and growth are the joint outcome of the way in which an economy responds to different shocks and, similarly, there are also "third factors" (legal systems, political institutions, technological innovations, among others) driving both financial and economic development. Second, regarding the inflation-growth and financial development-growth relationships, the theoretical literature presents arguments in favour of causality in both directions, some of which have been confirmed by our results in section 3. As discussed by Harris (1997) the standard procedure of choosing the initial value of a variable as the instrument of its value throughout the period may lead to misleading results. In particular, in the context of 15 This time though the transition period is much shorter since a higher coefficient of initial per capita income means that convergence to the steady state is much faster too.
When the financial development indicators are simultaneously included they are jointly significant. Nevertheless this result is mostly driven by the significance of the DCPY which is wrongly signed. The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT, DCPY and RESERVES is 0.01 (0.001) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate. The p-value for the F-test of the joint exclusion of QLLY, BTOT, DCPY, RESERVES and MKTCAP is 0.007 (0.005) in an equation excluding (including) the inflation rate.
financial and growth models, it can overstate the statistical significance of financial indicators. To avoid this, Harris proposes to run 2SLS using lagged values as instruments for the endogenous ones. Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the models estimated by instrumental variables. Equations in Table 5 do not include country-specific effects whereas those in Table 6 allow for these effects. Comparing results in Tables 3 and 5 (OLS and IV estimates of models without country-specific effects) some interesting results arise. First, the coefficient of inflation is negative and significant and its size is almost twice as large as that obtained in the OLS estimation.
This result is consistent the causality tests in section 3 in which a positive causality running from income to inflation was detected, thus leading to a simultaneity downward bias in the OLS estimation of the inflation costs. Second, in the IV estimation the coefficients of financial development proxies are not significant; only BTOT is close to the 10% level of significance when inflation is not included in the specification (column 2 of Table 5) . 17 This might imply that the observed positive effect of financial development on growth could be attributed, in our sample, to 
Conclusions
The empirical growth literature has focused in two particular links among inflation, growth and financial variables, namely the effect of financial development and of inflation on growth. In this paper we analyze the joint dynamics of these variables with the purpose of assessing the robustness of the inflation-growth link in developed countries. Our main contribution is the joint analysis of the effects of financial development and inflation on growth. We address this issue making use of a panel of OECD countries covering the period 1961-1993 and exploiting both the time-series and the cross-section dimension of the data. Furthermore, we augment the empirical model to allow for cross-country heterogeneity and we estimate by instrumental variables to take into account the simultaneity among the considered variables.
Our analysis shows that the negative effect of inflation in growth equations remains significant even after including financial market variables. Additionally, the link between proxies of financial market performance and growth is found to be weak, vanishing when country-dummies are included and endogeneity is accounted for using instrumental variables. Also, controlling for inflation reduces the significance of those indicators. Overall, these results indicate, first, that the long-run costs of inflation are genuine and not explained by a sort of omitted variable bias. These costs are not explained by policies of financial repression and although they may stem from the interconnection among inflation and financial market conditions, this
is not the only (nor the most important) channel.
In addition, our analysis has not found a significant positive growth-financial development link. There are three potential reasons for the lack of significance of this relationship in our analysis. First, the finance-growth link might be less relevant for industrialized countries with already highly developed financial systems. Second, the standard analysis of the finance-growth link does not correct the specification biases that might arise when cross-country heterogeneity and simultaneity among the considered variables are not taken into account. Finally, the proxies for financial development used in our analysis -which are the standard indicators in the empirical literature-might be adequate when analyzing large samples of countries, but might be too rough when focusing in a smaller and more homogeneous sample of countries, like our panel of OECD countries. In particular, we believe that the impact of financial markets on economic growth is more sophisticated than what these standard variables capture. On the one hand, these standard indicators do not cover all the agents or institutions that provide financial services. On the other hand, these indicators are mainly measuring the size of the institution or market without properly capturing the efficiency of the financial system. In our view, the construction of indicators of the efficiency of the financial system and the analysis of its impact on the process of economic growth are issues that deserve further research. 
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